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This inquiry seeks to establish the degree to which economic stimulus measures impact 
COVID-19 mortality rates.  There appears to be an inverse correlation between domestic social 
spending and COVID-19 deaths.  While confirmed infections are the most reliable predictor of 
mortality rates, trust in government is an important factor to consider when public compliance 
with health directives determines the degree of epidemiological risk in each country.  Although 
most economists agree that stimulus monies directed to low-income individuals to prevent 
financial collapse were appropriate, there is some dissention with regard to the type and size of 
such cash infusions.  Nonetheless, behavioral economists believe that any such payments ought 
to be large enough to incentivize compliance with lockdown and other containment measures.  
The COVID-19 pandemic is a historic event that will doubtless be analyzed from every angle; 
this inquiry seeks to contribute to that growing body of literature in hopes of guiding 
policymakers in achieving optimal outcomes through governmental spending measures in 
future emergencies.   
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This inquiry seeks to establish the degree to which economic stimulus measures impact 
COVID-19 death rates after controlling for cultural values such as in-group collectivism and 
trust in government, as well as each country’s policies to contain the spread of the novel 
coronavirus, total COVID-19 infections per million population, and development in terms of 
quality of life and access to education and healthcare.  I will begin by providing a background of 
the spread of COVID-19 and the rise in governmental measures to prevent infections, followed 
by a review of factors that improve and inhibit compliance with contagion-limiting practices, 
and the efficacy of governmental responses.  Then I will describe the dependent and 
independent variables under consideration in this research, the econometric model utilized, and 
my results and conclusions.  This inquiry seeks to contribute to a growing body of literature 
related to economic shocks and unanticipated disruptions to human activities which may guide 
policymakers in achieving optimal outcomes through governmental spending measures in 
future emergencies.   
2. BACKGROUND: 
COVID-19 is the illness that results from the novel coronavirus that emerged from the 
Wuhan region of China in late 2019 (Li et al., 2020; Rothan & Byrareddy, 2020; Ciotti et al., 
2020).  COVID-19 presents with an array of symptoms and varying severity, but typical cases 
involve respiratory difficulties, neurological symptoms such as loss of taste or smell, digestive 
issues, body aches, and fever.  Some cases are asymptomatic, while others become life-
threatening (p. 2, Rothan & Byrareddy, 2020).  The novel coronavirus is highly contagious, and 
rapidly spread from China to 20 other countries (South Korea, the United States, Macau, 
Singapore, Malaysia, Nepal, Vietnam, France, Australia, Canada, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, 
Germany, United Arab Emirates, Finland, India, the Philippines, Russia, Italy, and the United 
Kingdom) by the end of January 2020 (Kantis et al., 2020).   
 
2 
On January 30, 2020, the World Health Organization declared the novel coronavirus a 
public health emergency at the second meeting of the International Health Regulations 
Emergency Committee.  As COVID-19 infections surged to over 80,000 globally and the death 
toll surpassed 3,000, governments around the world began issuing lockdown orders, travel 
bans, and a moratorium on large gatherings in February 2020.  On March 11, 2020, the United 
Nations announced that one in five schoolchildren were no longer able to attend in-person 
classes due to the pandemic.  By March 25, 2020, “[n]early one third of the world’s population 
[was] affected by coronavirus lockdowns” (Kantis et al., 2020).  The World Health Organization 
(2020) initially recommended that individuals wash their hands frequently, cover their mouth 
when they sneezed, and sanitize surfaces often (p. 3).  In early April 2020, scientists confirmed 
that most person-to-person transmissions of the novel coronavirus occurred through airborne 
droplets, leading to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s recommendation that all 
members of the public wear fabric face masks when social distancing of at least 6 feet cannot be 
maintained or when in enclosed spaces with people who are not members of one’s household 
(Fisher et al., 2020).  In August 2020, the World Health Organization and International 
Monetary Fund reported that the pandemic cost the global economy over $375 billion per 
month (Kantis et al., 2020).  While the decision to stop international travel, ban large public 
gatherings, close schools, and enter lockdown varied in timing depending upon each country’s 
infection rates, the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic are undeniable and vast.   
3. LITERATURE REVIEW: 
Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, numerous academic treatises have been 
written with regard to the impact of contagion-limiting policy and their ensuing economic 
impacts.  These inquiries can be categorized into analyses of fiscal policy and studies of 
containment policies to limit the spread of COVID-19 and public compliance thereunder.   
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3.1 FISCAL POLICY 
The vast majority of economists endorse providing fiscal support for businesses and 
individuals during the COVID-19 pandemic (Agarwal et al., 2020; Alfaro et al., 2020; Ashraf, 
2020a; Barrios et al., 2021; Brodeur et al., 2020; Carlsson-Szlezak et al., 2020a; Carlsson-
Szlezak et al., 2020b; Chang & Velasco, 2020; Eichenbaum, Rebelo, & Trabandt, 2020; Elgin, 
Basbug, & Yalaman, 2020; Lou, Shen & Niemeier, 2020; Rho, Brown & Fremstad, 2020; Sieroń, 
2020; Soofi, Najafi, & Karami-Matin, 2020; Wright et al., 2020).  As the pandemic forced 
business closures and a shift to virtual work in many industries, the risk of hunger and 
homelessness increased.  Many governments responded to this sudden growth in economic 
instability by providing expanded unemployment benefits, direct cash stimulus to needy 
families, and subsidies to businesses to retain workers on their payrolls whilst unable to operate.  
The studies detailed below track the impact of COVID-19 containment measures on the 
economy, how to protect vulnerable populations from economic collapse, and how government 
policy responses may impact economic recovery once the COVID-19 pandemic is under control.   
The impact of COVID-19 containment measures on the economy at large are quite 
significant.  Brodeur et al. (2020) summarize Carlsson-Szlezak et al. (2020a) and Carlsson-
Szlezak et al.’s (2020b) research and state there are three ways that COVID-19 will impact the 
economy: 
The first is the direct impact, which is related to the reduced consumption of 
goods and services. Prolonged lengths of the pandemic and the social distancing 
measures might reduce consumer confidence by keeping consumers at home, 
wary of discretionary spending and pessimistic about the long-term economic 
prospects. The second one is the indirect impact working through financial 
market shocks and their effects on the real economy. Household wealth will likely 
fall, savings will increase, and consumption spending will decrease further. The 
third consists of supply-side disruptions; as COVID-19 keeps production halted, 
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it will negatively impact supply chains, labor demand, and employment, leading 
to prolonged periods of lay-offs and rising unemployment. (p. 18) 
These impacts can be seen through firm layoffs, decreased consumer borrowing, reduced stock 
market returns, and shortages of goods.  Makin & Layton (2021) find that these changes in 
consumer and business behavior lead to a “sharp 2020 budget deficit spike” (p. 343) due to 
diminished income, sales, and value-added tax volume, in addition to increased social support 
spending.  They question the wisdom of increased budget deficits and federal borrowing 
following the onset of the COVID-19 crisis, since governments will largely be accepting a debt 
burden for additional social welfare benefits without any tangible corresponding addition to 
government balance sheets.  Further, Makin & Layton (2021) state that granting cash support to 
low-income people during the pandemic is contrary to stay-at-home policies, and may be saved 
rather than spent due to economic uncertainty (p. 347).  However, while a significant amount of 
economic activity shifted online as the pandemic grew in severity and lockdown measures were 
implemented, the prevailing perspective of economists is that means-tested cash bailouts to 
individuals and families are unlikely to loiter in low-income people’s bank accounts when the 
degree of economic fallout from the COVID-19 crisis is so severe.  Feeding America (Morello, 
2021) states that 40% of the people served by food banks in the United States during the period 
March through October 2020 were receiving food assistance for the first time, and more than 
80% of food banks encountered increased demand year-over-year.  When food insecurity is at 
record levels in developed countries, cash infusions to underprivileged individuals appear not 
only to be the humane response, but also represent a relatively inexpensive alternative to 
outright economic collapse for the most vulnerable.   
Fiscal stimulus packages allow governments to respond to the COVID-19 crisis and 
ameliorate some of the losses and instability that disadvantaged communities experience due to 
the pandemic.  Lou, Shen & Niemeier (2020) argue “[o]ne possible mitigation measure is 
prioritizing financial, health care and economic support for the vulnerable groups, especially for 
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essential workers” (p. 17).  These measures not only may stave off hunger and homelessness for 
low-income people, but also encourage compliance with COVID-19 public health 
recommendations.  Chang & Velasco (2020) determined that while all countries should seek to 
perform COVID-19 testing at as great a scale as possible, if policymakers intend to provide fiscal 
stimulus monies to induce workers to stay at home, the size of the stimulus measures should 
increase alongside the rate of testing since individuals will anticipate lower risks from returning 
to work if testing rates are higher (p. 17).  Further, Soofi, Najafi, & Karami-Matin (2020) argue 
that fiscal measures are an opportunity to improve the reward for compliance with public health 
directives, and have been shown to boost “adherence to antiretroviral medication, smoking 
cessation, and weight loss, and […] to be effective in changing behaviors” (citations omitted) (p. 
346). Thus, fiscal measures address not just the economic consequences of COVID-19, but also 
limit its spread and severity, leading to multiplicative policy benefits.   
Financial markets also experienced volatility as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.  
Ashraf (2020a) utilized daily stock market return data during the first several months of the 
COVID-19 pandemic to determine financial markets’ responses to infection rates, lockdown 
orders, and economic stimulus packages.  This study found that lockdown and social distancing 
orders had direct negative effects and indirect positive effects on stock market returns (due to 
reduced business activities and reduced infection rates respectively), but that income support 
packages led to improved financial market performance.  Ashraf’s conclusions lend credence to 
the underlying theory of this analysis that economic stimulus packages incentivize social 
distancing and contagion-limiting behavior, leading to lower infection rates among countries 
that implement robust income support packages.   
Recovery from the COVID-19 crisis is dependent upon the population becoming 
immunized (either through vaccination or herd immunity), and a return to at least the previous 
level of economic activities.  However, Carlsson-Szlezak, Reeves & Swartz (2020b) find that 
while all previous pandemics caused V-shaped economic shocks, where there is a steep decline 
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in output followed by a sharp recovery, the COVID-19 pandemic may not follow this trend due to 
the extraordinary lockdown measures imposed to control the spread of the virus.  Makin & 
Layton (2021) detail these vast economic effects as both an aggregate demand shock and 
aggregate supply shock due to supply chain breakdowns, closure of non-essential workplaces, 
loss of employment income to individuals and families, and increased uncertainty across the 
board (p. 340).  As a result, more robust policy responses are recommended to address the 
extreme economic impact of COVID-19.  “[Céspedes, Chang & Velasco (2020)] argue the 
optimal policy response is to combine loosening of monetary policy with enhanced social 
insurance. In contrast, unconventional policies such as wage subsidies, helicopter drops of 
liquid assets, equity injections, and loan guarantees can keep the economy in a full employment, 
high-productivity equilibrium” (p. 44, Brodeur et al., 2020).  Clearly, government fiscal policy is 
at risk of not being aggressive enough, rather than providing too much support and experiencing 
dead-weight loss.   
3.2 COVID-19 CONTAINMENT POLICIES AND PUBLIC COMPLIANCE 
While the financial impact of COVID-19 containment policies cannot be overstated, the 
impact and efficacy of containment policies are also a key object of study in the emerging body 
of academic literature.  As El Zowalatya & Järhultc (2020) succinctly state, “Coronaviruses 
represent a continuous pandemic threat; humans have experienced two coronavirus-related 
health security crises since 2003” (p. 1).  As a result, government responses, albeit clearly 
deleterious economically, appear measured and necessary in the context of the highly 
transmissible and potentially fatal novel coronavirus.  According to John Hopkins University 
(2020), containment measures consisting of social distancing, the closure of businesses, schools, 
churches and public gathering places are intended to “[flatten] the curve [by] reducing the 
number of new COVID-19 cases from one day to the next. This helps prevent healthcare systems 
from becoming overwhelmed.”  Especially at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, medical 
experts acknowledged the impossibility of eliminating the disease without an effective vaccine, 
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so limiting stress on healthcare systems became the primary object of concern.  Unfortunately, 
some of these measures may have been more stringent than necessary.  Agarwal et al. (2020), 
state that after a 40% decrease in mobility, “lifting severe mobility restrictions and only 
retaining moderate mobility restrictions (at retail and transit locations), seems to effectively 
flatten the curve” (emphasis in original) (p. 1).  The diminishing effectiveness of decreasing 
human movements on limiting mortality rates may be a result of sufficiently flattening the curve 
to ensure hospital availability for COVID-19 infections that require intensive care.  Nonetheless, 
some people may feel disheartened to recognize that a 40% decrease in mobility may have 
sufficient to optimally minimize COVID-19 deaths.  El Zowalatya & Järhultc (2020) emphasize 
that “a mixture of measures is important [to decrease human-to-human transmission] from 
strictly medical (transmission routes, efficiency of PPE, vaccines, antivirals and so on) to more 
social science-oriented (How do people behave when they suspect they could be infected? How 
do they behave when they are sick? How to potentially change these behaviours?)” (p. 6).  While 
social distancing, travel bans and lockdown measures were appropriate from an epidemiological 
perspective, human behavior is not so simple or open to change regardless of public health 
recommendations.   
A variety of factors appear to influence to what degree people comply with public health 
advisories to limit transmission of COVID-19.  Wright et al. (2020) determined that poverty and 
economic dislocation related to or worsened by COVID-19 lockdown measures inhibit 
compliance with social distancing and shelter-in-place orders.  Essential workers usually qualify 
as low income and/or perform services in environments that require interactions with scores of 
members of the public, such as pharmacies, grocery stores, healthcare, convenience stores, 
warehouses, public transit, and childcare (Rho, Brown & Fremstad, 2020).  Karaye & Horney 
(2020) tested whether a social vulnerability index (compiled by the CDC and including 
measurements for socioeconomic status, household composition, disability, minority status, 
language spoken, and access to transportation) impacted COVID-19 infections per 100,000 
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population, and found that the social vulnerability index overall, and all factors other than 
socioeconomic status, were statistically significant and positively correlated with increased 
COVID-19 infections (pp. 318-319).  Meanwhile, Lou, Shen & Niemeier (2020) determined that 
lower income individuals are “less likely to (be able) to follow the order to stay at home, 
controlling for other factors” (p. 16).  As a result, it is reasonable to expect low-income 
individuals and their families to bear the brunt of the pandemic. 
Barrios et al. (2021) utilize location data from cellular phones and data from surveys to 
conclusively determine that there is a link between regions with high levels of civic capital and 
voluntary compliance with social distancing measures, noting that “in the absence of any 
punishment, an infected individual derives no personal benefit from complying with public 
health recommendations, despite the potentially large social benefits” (p. 2).  Similarly, Ashraf 
(2020b) reviewed 43 countries’ uncertainty avoidance and COVID-19 confirmed infections in 
relation to stock market returns, theorizing that countries with higher uncertainty avoidance 
would panic-sell at higher rates in response to increased COVID-19 infections, even after taking 
significant losses in the stock market (pp. 3-4).  The model confirmed this hypothesis and 
determined that cultural values are a significant factor in determining stock markets’ responses 
to the COVID-19 pandemic.  In accordance with Rousseau’s (2016) famed stag hunt parable of 
game theory, individuals will only cooperate with one another for a higher payoff if they expect 
the other player to cooperate.  If individuals are dubious of others’ compliance with social 
distancing, hand washing, or mask-wearing protocols, they may determine that there is a higher 
return for non-compliance themselves and choose not to cooperate with the socially 
advantageous public health recommendations.  Similarly, Brodeur et al. (2020) cite a study by 
Eichenbaum, Rebelo, & Trabandt (2020) that emphasizes that “the competitive equilibrium is 
not Pareto optimal, as agents do not consider that their actions impact the infection and death 
rates of other economic agents. To properly internalize the externality, the authors suggest that 
the containment measures are optimal if they are tightened over time in proportion to the 
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spread of infection” (p. 24).  This, combined with Soofi, Najafi, & Karami-Matin’s (2020) finding 
that individuals believe they are less likely to catch the novel coronavirus than their peers, “even 
if their peers adhere to preventive practices” (p. 347), indicates that humans are poor judges of 
risky behaviors.  As a result, people cannot be expected to comply with public health orders out 
of altruism or self-interest.  In contrast, Alfaro, et al. (2020) found that “preference traits, such 
as patience, altruism, and trust, as well as community traits, such as reciprocity, matter for the 
behavioral response of individuals during a pandemic” (p. 41).  Soofi, Najafi, & Karami-Matin 
(2020) recommend framing health-protective behaviors in terms of gains to the individual, 
“such as ‘If you wash your hands properly/follow social distancing policy/adhere to the stay-at-
home policy, you will increase the chances of yourself and your family having a long, healthy 
life’” (p. 347), and “draw[ing] attention to what other people are doing” (p. 348).  Through these 
simple changes in public service announcements, epidemiologists and healthcare professionals 
may utilize the wisdom of behavioral economics to maximize behavior change and minimize 
COVID-19 transmissions.   
Given that individuals will only comply when they expect others to also comply with 
contagion-limiting protocols and otherwise default to status quo behavior, regions with higher 
civic capital (and thus higher rates of compliance) generate self-reinforcing effects that lead to 
fewer infections in certain regions.  In order to account for these factors in this model, I will 
consider trust in government and in-group collectivism practices to control for regional 
differences in civic capital and its impacts on COVID-19 mortality rates.   
4. METHODOLOGY:   
This research depends upon an ordinary least squares regression that measures a 
combined value of government domestic social spending and COVID-19 fiscal measures 
distributed to individuals and healthcare systems, COVID-19 infections per million population, a 
trust in government index, an in-group collectivism values index, a human development index, 
and a containment and health index’s impact upon COVID-19 mortality rates.  The regression is 
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run traditionally and using the robust function to account for any heteroskedasticity with nearly 
identical results (see Table 1).  The origins of the data and the transformations performed upon 
them are described in more detail below.   
4.1 DATA SOURCES 
4.1.1 FISCAL MEASURES AND COVID-19 INFECTION AND MORTALITY DATA 
The fiscal measures were determined utilizing data provided by the University of Oxford, 
Blatvatnik School of Government’s “Coronavirus Government Response Tracker” (Hale, et al., 
2021) which included the total amount of fiscal measures provided to individuals and healthcare 
systems in 2020 U.S. dollars from the beginning of the pandemic through January 17, 2021.  
Using measurements of GDP per capita and current population for each country provided by 
Our World in Data, the emergency domestic fiscal measures provided to individuals and 
healthcare systems were calculated as a percentage of each country’s GDP.  This was combined 
with the OECD’s social spending data as a percent of GDP as of 2017 in order to generate an 
approximation of each country’s domestic social spending as a percent of GDP after the onset of 
the COVID-19 crisis.  This aligns with OECD (2020) predictions that the “COVID-19 pandemic 
of 2020 is expected to lead to a marked increase in social spending” (p. 2).  As a result, the 
combined value of 2017 domestic social spending, fiscal measures, and emergency healthcare 
funding as a percentage of GDP is intended to approximate the OECD’s social spending 
indicator for 2020 until these figures become available.  Meanwhile, COVID-19 infection and 
mortality rates are measured at a rate of per million population to account for variation in 
population size across the 27 countries evaluated.  Next, I will discuss the various indexes 
utilized to control for variation in culture and government responsiveness in terms of lockdown 
and social distancing measures.   
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4.1.2 INDEXES FOR CULTURAL VALUES AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE PANDEMIC 
In this research, a variety of indexes are used to control for cultural variation and 
asymmetrical responsiveness to the COVID-19 crisis, including the OECD’s trust in government 
indicator, the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness’ 2004 Culture, 
Leadership, and Organizations study’s in-group collectivism practices index, the United Nations 
Development Programme’s human development index, and the University of Oxford’s  
COVID-19 containment and health index.  The OECD’s trust in government indicator is on a 
scale of 1 to 100 and evaluates the share of survey respondents over a three-year period who 
responded “‘yes’ […] to the survey question: ‘In this country, do you have confidence in … 
national government?’” (OECD).  The GLOBE study includes indices for a number of cultural 
values and practices, including the in-group collectivism practices index which measures “the 
degree to which members in a culture express pride, loyalty, and interdependence in their 
families. […]  It is associated with pride in affiliation and a general affective commitment toward 
family, group, community, and nation” (Gupta & Kirwan, 2013).  Because the in-group 
collectivism practices index was determined on a seven-point scale while all other indexes in this 
research were on a scale of 1 to 100, the GLOBE scores for each country were divided by seven 
and multiplied by 100 to ensure uniformity in the model.  In addition, the in-group collectivism 
practices index scores for East Germany and West Germany were combined proportional to the 
percent of population present in each region as of 2004 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2017).  The 
United Nations Development Programme’s human development index provides a “summary 
measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy 
life, being knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living” (Roser et al., 2020).  Finally, the 
University of Oxford’s containment and health index aggregates 13 measures including school 
and workplace closures, the cancellation of public events, restrictions on gatherings, public 
transit closure, stay at home requirements, restrictions on internal movements, international 
travel controls, public information campaigns, testing policies, contact tracing, facial covering 
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policies, and vaccination policies.  Each of these closure, containment and health measures are 
determined on an ordinal scale from “no policy in place” to the most stringent policy possible.  
The index is then calculated by dividing each country’s daily score for each measure listed above 
by the maximum ordinal value of that measurement, multiplied by 100 and averaged to generate 




COVID-19 Deaths per Million Population 
Traditional OLS Robust OLS 
COVID-19 Infections per Million Population 0.014 0.014 
(5.83) ** (6.46) ** 
Trust in Government Index 12.143 -12.143 
(2.23)  * (2.57)  * 
Domestic Social Spending, Fiscal Measures and 
Additional Healthcare Spending as a Percent of GDP 
-39.901 -39.901 
 (0.08) (0.09) 
In-Group Collectivism Practices Index -3.911 -3.911 
 (0.55) (0.72) 
Human Development Index -14.519 -14.519 
 (0.89) (1.01) 
COVID-19 Containment and Health Index -3.574 -3.574 
(0.68) (0.75) 
Constant 2,542.737 2,542.737 
(1.47) (1.55) 
R2 0.733 0.733 
N 27 27 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; parentheses indicate t-test values 
Complete regression outputs are available in Appendix B.   
Based upon this model, the baseline number of COVID-19 deaths is approximately 2,500 
per million population, which increases with infections per million population, and decreases 
with the in-group collectivism practices index, the human development index, the containment 
and health index, and the sum of social spending, fiscal measures, and additional healthcare 
spending per million population.  While Our World in Data (Roser et al., 2020) indicates a 
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mean case fatality rate of about 2.1% (COVID-19 infections per million resulting in COVID-19 
deaths per million population) in the 23 countries included in this analysis, the model 
determines there is a 1.4% confirmed case fatality rate, demonstrating an overrepresentation of 
wealthy countries with advanced healthcare systems in this dataset or that some portion of the 
COVID-19 mortality rate is absorbed by the other explanatory variables in the model.   
This model accounts for 73.3% of the variation in COVID-19 deaths per million 
population, although only the infections per million population and trust in government were 
statistically significant at a 1% and 5% level, respectively.  While the majority of the independent 
variables in this model are not statistically significant, the relatively high R2 value and the 
intuitive signs of the coefficients indicate that the in-group collectivism practices index, the 
human development index, the containment and health index, and the combined value of 
domestic social spending, fiscal measures, and additional healthcare spending are correlated 
with fewer COVID-19 deaths, even if the null hypothesis that these variables have no impact on 
COVID-19 cannot be empirically rejected.   
It is unsurprising that fiscal measures intended to restore economic activity and rescue 
impoverished families during the COVID-19 pandemic were not a statistically significant 
predictor of COVID-19 deaths.  While fewer deaths are correlated with more domestic social 
spending and fiscal measures, Brodeur et al. (2020) reviewed a study from Elgin, Basbug & 
Yalaman (2020) which found that a COVID-19 “‘Stringency Index’ [was] a not a significant 
predictor of economic stimulus, which suggests that public health measures do not drive 
economic stimulus measures” (p. 38).  A stronger correlation may have been evident if 
governments responded to increased infections and deaths with higher fiscal allotments, but 
such a response may not have been economically advisable.  While it is important for 
policymakers to ensure that fiscal stimulus measures are sufficient to encourage contagion-
limiting behavior (id., p. 43), stimulus measures were primarily directed toward rescuing low-
income families from economic collapse and financial ruin.  In fact, stimulus measures were 
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primarily distributed in hopes of dispelling the risks of a domestic and global financial crisis, 
especially with the specter of the Great Recession so recent in many economists’ and 
policymakers’ memories.  As observed in 2008, an economic crisis may have global impacts on 
financial markets due to the interconnected nature of the modern global economy (Helleiner, 
2011).   
Perhaps more unexpected is the meager impact of containment and health restrictions 
on COVID-19 mortality rates.  The containment and health restrictions measured by the 
University of Oxford’s “Coronavirus Government Response Tracker” (Hale, et al., 2021) may be 
negatively correlated at a statistically insignificant level due to a time lag in some countries 
adopting restrictions on commerce, travel, and non-essential social interactions, or due to the 
inherent flaws in measuring government policy on an ordinal scale to generate an index for the 
restrictiveness of various countries’ response to the pandemic.  If the issue lies in the former 
possibility, a time series dataset may have different results from those found herein.  The final 
alternative is that as our knowledge and understanding of how COVID-19 spreads from person-
to-person improves, containment and health policy responses may become more effectual and 
accurate in targeting high-risk activities.  As it stands, the “closest analogy [to the current 
contagion-limiting approach] is to government command and control of economies in wartime, 
in this case with the virus as the foreign invader” (p. 340, Makin & Layton, 2021).  Some 
measures to control spread of the virus have been criticized as draconian, and while the costs of 
lockdown measures are certainly quite high (as high as “$7 trillion per year of shutdown” in the 
United States alone [p. 2, Mulligan, 2020]), Sieroń (2020) explains that “COVID-19 is an 
infectious disease, which means that the risk is multiplicative. It implies that actions that seem 
irrational or exaggerated at an individual level are precisely the actions we need from the 
systemic point of view” (p. 5).  Nonetheless, it is disheartening to question whether the impact of 
these containment measures was as substantial as policymakers hoped.   
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Finally, while primarily included in this model in order to control for anticipated 
variation across OECD countries, the negative correlation between COVID-19 deaths and in-
group collectivism practices, trust in government, and the human development index align with 
expectations that greater pride in country, confidence in government communiques, and access 
to quality healthcare would improve COVID-19 infection rates and mortality rates.    
4.3 ROBUSTNESS AND LIMITATIONS 
The ordinary least squares regressions in this analysis meet the seven assumptions of 
econometric regression modeling as demonstrated by the graphs and summary statistics in 
Appendix B.  The relationships are more or less linear based upon the kernel-weighted local 
polynomial regression performed upon each of the independent variables.  The variance 
inflation factor scores indicate multicollinearity is not an issue in these models.  The mean of the 
error terms is very nearly zero (-0.00000126).  The independent variables are not correlated 
with residuals and there is no pattern to the distribution that would indicate heteroskedasticity 
(see Residuals vs. Fitted Values graph on page 26).  There is no serial correlation in the models 
since the data are cross-sectional.  No independent variable is perfectly correlated with any 
other variable (see Correlation Matrix on page 26).  Finally, the error term is normally 
distributed (see Density vs. Residuals graph on page 25).  As a result, while the model is largely 
not statistically significant, ordinary least squares regressions appear to be appropriate in the 
context of this analysis.   
4.4 FURTHER RESEARCH 
Because the models utilized herein were not as conclusive as hoped, there are a number 
of directions that future research may take in order to more effectively determine the 
relationship between COVID-19 fiscal measures and mortality rates.  Time series data for a 
larger grouping of countries may be useful to more accurately reflect containment measures and 
fiscal stimulus measures’ impact on mortality rates, given that there is a time delay between 
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cash infusions and alteration of consumer activity (p. 41, Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2009) and that 
some countries enacted containment measures more rapidly in response to confirmed infections 
than others.  Further, a difference-in-differences approach may be useful to contrast excess 
deaths and COVID-19 fiscal stimulus measures with pre-pandemic norms.  Additionally, 
generating a categorical variable that divides each countries’ residents into low-income, middle-
income, and high-income tiers and reflects the infection and mortality rates for each group may 
allow the impact of fiscal measures (which primarily were distributed to low-income 
individuals) to be more apparent.  Finally, once the OECD’s social spending indicator for 2020 is 
available, it may be worthwhile to repeat the regressions herein in order to determine the degree 
of accuracy achieved by combining emergency COVID-19 healthcare spending, stimulus 
measures to individuals, and the 2017 social spending indicator to determine domestic welfare 
budgeting during the COVID-19 crisis.   
5. CONCLUSION:  
This inquiry sought to establish the degree to which economic stimulus measures impact 
COVID-19 mortality rates.  While the results herein are not as conclusive as hoped, there does 
appear to be an inverse correlation between domestic social spending and COVID-19 deaths.  
Further, while confirmed infections are the most reliable predictor of mortality rates, trust in 
government is an important factor to consider when public compliance with health directives 
determines the degree of epidemiological risk in each country.  Although most economists agree 
that stimulus monies directed to low-income individuals to prevent financial collapse were 
appropriate, there is some dissention with regard to the type and size of such cash infusions.  
Nonetheless, behavioral economists believe that any such payments ought to be large enough to 
incentivize compliance with lockdown and other containment measures.  The COVID-19 
pandemic is a historic event that will doubtless be analyzed from every angle; this inquiry seeks 
to contribute to that growing body of literature in hopes of guiding policymakers in achieving 
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APPENDIX B – REGRESSION RESULTS AND ASSUMPTION TESTS 
 





Traditional Ordinary Least Squares Regression  
 
 
Density vs. Residuals 











Residuals vs. Fitted Values Graph 
(Residuals Not Correlated with Fitted Values) 
 
 
